



FIRE DEPARTMENT

250 LIVINGSTON STREET BROOKLYN, N.Y. 11201-5884

TO: JOHN DWYER DEPUTY CHIEF 6th DIV.
FROM: JOSEPH NALLAN LIEUT. HAZ MAT CO 1
SUBJECT: BRONX BOX 2400 MAY 25,1994

CHIEF DWYER;

JUST A THANKYOU FOR YOUR KIND WORDS REGARDING HAZ MAT CO 1 OPERATION AT INCIDENT. ITS NOT EVERY DAY THAT HAZ MAT HAS THESE LEVEL A JOBS. THOSE LEVEL A FULLY ENCAPSULATED SUITS ARE TORTURE TO BE IN FOR ANY AMOUNT OF TIME.

THANKS FOR RECONSIDERING OUR UNIT CITATION REQUEST. CHIEF DITTA SAID TO FORWARD IT TO YOU FOR YOUR ENDORSEMENT.

ONCE AGAIN ITS NICE TO HAVE OUR UNIT RECOGNIZED, THANK YOU.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

Joseph F. Nallan
LT HAZ MAT CO 1 GR 14

REPORT OF UNIT CITATION

Unit


Date

6. DESCRIPTION OF UNIT OPERATION:

On 5/25/94 at 1202 hrs. Hazardous Materials Co. #1(Haz-Mat) responded to Bronx Box 2400 for a reported leak of a hazardous material from a truck. While responding to the scene, the **Haz-Mat Officer** (Lt. Joseph Nallan) was informed by radio what the suspected chemicals were. The **Resource Man** (FF. Martin Demeo) and the **Entry Team** (FF's Frederick Herrmann & Philip McArdle) began the process of gathering information about the product.

Upon the Hazardous Materials Company's' arrival at the scene , the **Haz-Mat Officer** reported to the command post for a size-up from the Incident Commander (Deputy Chief Dwyer 6th Division) and the Operations Chief (Battalion Chief Ditta 3rd Battalion). After the briefing by the Incident Commander & the Operations Chief, the **Haz-Mat Officer** directed the **Entry Team** to interview the driver who was being treated by EMS, he then had the **Back-up Team** (FF's James Hay & Richard Gimbl) reposition the apparatus and await further orders while the **Decon Team** (FF's Hugh Masterson E-324 & James Daly E-319) accompanied the **Haz-Mat Officer** to select a site to set up and begin operations.

The **Entry Team** observed that the driver was suffering acute exposure to some kind of hazardous material, his skin was red and irritated, his respiratory system was traumatized and he was complaining of skin irritation & difficulty breathing, he was being administered oxygen for this condition. Based on visual observations, no permeation or degradation of his clothes was apparent. Whatever he was exposed to was an airborne contaminant that was a dermal & respiratory irritant. The **Entry Team** verified that the driver opened the back of the trailer; which was how his exposure occurred. He did not handle the containers and was unsure what was damaged. EMS was advised by the **Entry Team** on protection for themselves, given the signs & symptoms of exposure as well as the recommended first aid procedures. The **Entry Team** reported back to the **Haz-Mat Officer** who, by now had selected a site to set up operations (see figure 1).



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
Date

6. DESCRIPTION OF UNIT OPERATION:

The **Back-up Team** and the **Decon Team** began to layout the equipment that was going to be needed for the initial site survey. The **Resource Man** was doing several things at once to get more information and document the incident. This was an international shipment and many phone calls had to be made to find a representative in the United States who could answer questions about the product. Other agencies were also contacted by the **Resource Man** during the incident as per the Emergency Response Plan & Federal Regulations. The **Resource Man** had to find information on chemical compatibility with the protective clothing, provide material safety data sheet (MSDS) information for the personnel on the scene; this information was also requested by Dr. Klien of the medical office for the treatment of injured members.

The **Decon Team** began assisting the Entry & Back-up Team donning their protective clothing. The **Haz-Mat Officer** assembled the **Entry, Back-up & Decon Team** for the pre-entry briefing and positioning of personnel during the operation. The **Entry Team's** mission was to identify & confirm the information about the products, their containers and their surrounding environment. They were to do damage assessment and mitigate the incident if possible on the first entry if possible. (Several conflicting pieces of information made it necessary for the Entry Team to give reliable information to the Haz-Mat Officer and the Incident Commander).

Haz-Mat 1 began its operations with the **Entry Team** gaining access to the rear of the trailer and securing a special type of "A" frame to the rear bumper. Initial reconnaissance by the **Entry Team** revealed a substantial amount of oil (foodstuffs), a dozen or so wooden pallets, 4 wooden crates containing Thionyl Chloride and one fiber board container containing Methoxycarbonylphenyl Chloroformate (see figure 2).




REPORT OF UNIT CITATION

Unit

Date

6. DESCRIPTION OF UNIT OPERATION:

Upon closer inspection it was determined that two of the wooden crates (numbered 1 of 4 and 2 of 4) had some chemical permeation and degradation. The **Entry Team** move the unaffected containers away from the spill to prevent the possibility of any adverse reactions. In order to complete the damage assessment and mitigation of the incident, the containers had to be opened, this was anticipated and forcible entry tools were brought in and used for that purpose. Crates 1 of 4 and 2 of 4 were opened and began fuming on exposure to air. The products was extremely toxic and reactive. Thionyl Chloride has a TLV of 1




part per million as compared to cyanide with a TLV of 5 parts per million. The **Entry Team** began the tedious process of removing 500 ml. & 2.5 lt. amber glass bottles from the crates; this had to be done carefully because of the broken glass. Damaged containers were placed on one side of the trailer and undamaged on the other temporarily. Everything was going to be repackaged to prevent additional damage, leaks & spills. The **Entry Team** observed that the crates were not secured and the interior packaging inside the crate was not adequate; many of the 500 ml bottles worked their way down through the loose packing material where bottle to bottle contact caused breaks and cracks which resulted in leaks and the spill.

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observed that the crates were not secured and the interior packaging inside the crate was not adequate; many of the 500 ml bottles worked their way down through the loose packing material where bottle to bottle contact caused breaks and cracks which resulted in leaks and the spill.



The **Haz-Mat Officer** realizing that the work could not be accomplished in one entry and after conferring with the Incident Commander and the Operations Chief sent the **Back-up Team** to assist. The **Entry Team** left the trailer went to the contamination reduction area and was deconned by the Decon Team. A quick debriefing by the **Haz-Mat Officer** of the **Entry Team** occurred and their air supply was replenished. While this was transpiring a simultaneous incident occurred in Queens with civilians overcome. The **Haz-Mat Officer and the Resource Man** began managing two incidents at the same time, providing information to both. This was necessary because 13 D the rescue liaison, which normally would handle simultaneous incidents was no longer operating.

The **Back-up Team** continued to work while the **Entry Team** was being deconned and re supplied with air. The **Entry Team** returned and work with the **Back-up Team**. They over packed the damaged and broken glass containers in a 12 gallon recovery drum (broken

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1 - 500 ml & 1 - 2.5 liter / cracked 1 - 500 ml & 1 - 2.5 liter). The **Back-up Team** then continued to overtake the undamaged glass containers in the 55 gallon recovery drum that the **Entry Team** had started but could not complete (14 - 500 ml & 10 - 2.5 liter containers). The wooden crates were disassembled and thrown in an 85 gallon recovery drum. Both **Entry & Back-up Teams** came out were deconned by the **Decon Team**. One more entry would be necessary to complete the work.

After a brief medical evaluation and rehydration the **Entry Team** made it's third entry of the operation in level "B" to finish the final Overpacking of all contaminated materials. They sealed all containers, secured the trailed and proceeded to decon. Fire Department were then concluded and the Incident Commander turned operations over to DEP.

The Hazardous Materials Company worked continually making multiple entries to accomplish tedious work tasks without relief, demonstrating diligence, perseverance and teamwork until the hazardous condition was eliminated. They operated in a professional manner, disseminating conflicting information, providing the right information to the multiple agencies present, exhibiting dedication and determination to handle an extremely toxic substance. It is for these reasons I request they be considered for a Unit Citation

Respectfully

Deputy Chief John Dwyer
6th Div. Group Date

7. RECOMMENDATION:

Deputy Chief

Division

Date



FIRE DEPARTMENT • CITY OF NEW YORK
Supplement to Department Order No. 117 ☆ Issue No. 107
September 22, 1994



2.1.1

BOARD OF MERIT

The following information records the action of the Board of Merit at a meeting held September 12, 1994:

UNIT CITATIONS

ENGINE CO. 33—March 25, 1994
Box 22-418, 1646 hours
37 E. 1st Street, Manhattan
Capt. William J. Youngson, D. 1
FF. Louis J. Trazino
FF. Brian E. Bilcher
FF. Daniel G. Nelson
FF. Gregory J. Gessner, L. 9

ENGINE CO. 259—April 3, 1994
Box 75-0050, 0040 hours
192 Huron Street, Brooklyn
Capt. Francis X. Donnelly, D. 14
FF. Patrick A. Huss
FF. Michael J. Kollman
FF. Michael C. Conklin, L. 128
FF. William G. Edwards, L. 128

LADDER CO. 59—April 11, 1994
Box 75-2927, 0747 hours
150 W. 174th Street, Bronx
Lt. Gerard M. Murtha, L. 59
FF. Joseph Baldwin
FF. Brian J. Healy
FF. Robert G. King
FF. Thomas G. O'Shea
FF. Michael S. Boland, E. 43

ENGINE CO. 298—April 22, 1994
Box 22-4798, 1432 hours
170-25 93rd Avenue, Queens
Lt. Daniel N. Willis, B. 50
FF. Andrew Yturraspe
FF. Joseph G. Tesoriero
FF. Paul T. Moyik
FF. Raymond J. Rothfritz, L. 125

LADDER CO. 16—April 22, 1994
Box 75-979, 1126 hours
136 E. 67th Street, Manhattan
Lt. Douglas D. Tripken
FF. Edward L. Opfer
FF. Ronald M. Cammarata
FF. James D. Mahon
FF. Dean G. Pappas
FF. Daniel G. Ross
FF. Steven C. Wright

ENGINE CO. 34—April 29, 1994
Box 22-655, 1330 hours
502 W. 28th Street, Manhattan
Lt. Lawrence K. Blieka, B. 7
FF. Paul P. Fusaro
FF. Thomas P. McKenna
FF. Michael R. Cain

LADDER CO. 104—May 4, 1994
Box 224, 1553 hours
Williamsburg Bridge, Brooklyn
Capt. Wicher M. Kobes
FF. Joseph D. Cicha
FF. Umberto A. Gallo
FF. Anthony R. Cavalieri
FF. Michael T. Smith
FF. Gerard Brickman, E. 216

RESCUE CO. 1—May 11, 1994
Box 785, 1320 hours
250 W. 43rd Street, Manhattan
Lt. Kevin P. Williams, S.O.C.
FF. Thomas H. Baker
FF. Dennis S. Amodio
FF. John P. Theobald
FF. Paul T. Baldwin
FF. Michael G. Montesi

ENGINE CO. 36—May 13, 1994
Box 44-1477, 1945 hours
28 W. 125th Street, Manhattan
Capt. John F. Bruckner
FF. Frederick J. Schaming
FF. John J. Hear
FF. James G. Houlahan
FF. Michael G. Hance
FF. William Kline

HAZ/MAT CO. 1—May 25, 1994
Box 2400, 1202 hours
997 E. 149th Street, Bronx
Lt. Joseph F. Nallan
FF. Martin N. DeMeo
FF. Richard J. Gimbl
FF. James F. Hay
FF. Frederick E. Herrmann
FF. Philip H. McArdle
FF. James E. Daley, E. 319
FF. Hugh M. Masterson, E. 324

ENGINE CO. 16—May 26, 1994
Box 22-664, 1015 hours
221 E. 28th Street, Manhattan
Lt. John E. Rafferty, L. 4
FF. Donald Carcone
FF. Matthew J. Kelly
FF. Raymond A. Disanza
FF. Frederick Soller

LADDER CO. 14—June 4, 1994
Box 75-1535, 1930 hours
15 E. 131st Street, Manhattan
Lt. Kenneth G. Schermerhorn
FF. Thomas J. Kelly
FF. John F. McGurran
FF. Dennis P. Albrechtsen
FF. Michael K. Gayson
FF. Robert Faiella

LADDER CO. 104—June 21, 1994
Box 22-127, 0344 hours
2 Hope Street, Brooklyn
Lt. Kevin J. Cassidy
FF. Samuel T. Giamo
FF. Patrick L. Williams
FF. Joseph W. Quinn
FF. James M. Butler
FF. Fredrick J. Mallett

ENGINE CO. 221—June 21, 1994
Box 22-127, 0344 hours
2 Hope Street, Brooklyn
Lt. William J. McLaughlin
FF. Vito S. Oliva
FF. Paul R. Martini, L. 104
FF. Louis G. Gorgano
FF. Robert P. Johnson

RESCUE CO. 1—July 1, 1994
Box 1247, 0320 hours
1867 2nd Avenue, Manhattan
Lt. Kevin P. Williams, S.O.C.
FF. Paul F. Hashagen
FF. Joseph J. Angelini
FF. Kenneth E. Kaasmann
FF. James E. Smith
FF. Michael G. Montesi